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Abstract:
Intuition and common beliefs can sometimes misguide the mediator and be obstacles to the
success of mediation, when they are linked to behaviors which likely induce negative
consequences in the process. Following four different stages of a mediation session, this paper
names a series of such obstacles and explores their underlying intuitions, as well as their
subsequent usual behavior and its rather negative effects. Each time, alternative strategies that
increase expectations of success are suggested, with their expected outcome.  This paper
combines a descriptive approach of obstacles which increase the chance of a negative process
and mediation failure, with a prescriptive approach of alternative behaviors that increase the
chance of a positive process and mediation success.
Key Words:
Mediation – Success –  Failure – Obstacles – Process – Intuition – Mediator’s Behavior –
Descriptive Approach – Prescriptive Approach
Résumé :
L’intuition et les croyances communes peuvent parfois tromper un médiateur et constituer des
obstacles au succès de la médiation, quand ces facteurs sont liés à des comportements induisant
des conséquences négatives sur le processus. Suivant quatre étapes successives, ce document fait
ressortir une série d’obstacles et en explore les intuitions sous-jacentes, ainsi que les
comportements habituels subséquents et leur effets plutôt négatifs. A chaque fois, des stratégies
alternatives qui accroissent les chances de succès sont suggérées, avec leur issue attendue. Ce
papier combine une approche descriptive des obstacles qui augmentent le risque d’un processus
négatif et d’un échec de la médiation, avec une approche  prescriptive de comportements
alternatifs qui optimisent la chance d’un processus positif et de succès de la médiation.
Mots-clés :
Médiation – Succès –  Echec – Obstacles – Processus – Intuition – Comportement du médiateur
–  Approche descriptive – Approche  prescriptiveObstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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Intuition helps mediators in their dialogue with parties. It contributes to their relevant
management of the major steps and transitions in the mediation process; it also guides them in
their micro-interactions with parties, in each of their sentences or gestures so to speak. At the
same time, intuitions may lead to entrapment words or behaviors, which can be as many
obstacles to the success of a mediation process (Lempereur, 1999a, 1999b).
As Kleiboer (1996) clearly shows, the definition of success in mediation may be approached in
several ways. In order to avoid a problematic definition, Assefa (1987) chooses not to define at
all what success means. The most common definition makes it a factor of outcome, like reaching
a partial or total settlement (Bercovitch,  Anagnoson, and Wille, 1991; Susskind and  Babbitt,
1992). Others, like  Touval and  Zartman (1985), will consider the mediator’s or the parties’
objectives as a starting point, and success or not can then be defined as effectiveness, the
capacity or not to reach such objectives, though we sometimes know such objectives may not
always be very clear at the outset of a mediation. These two definitions are either based on a
subjective approach – do parties or the mediator think mediation is a success? – or on an
objective approach – is there an agreement? Whatever definition is finally adopted, the impact of
mediation must be assessed both ways. There is a success when parties (and not so much the
mediator) go away with an agreement and/or the impression that mediation helped them. They
should be better off before than after the mediation, as when a doctor intervenes on an illness.
Success is defined at the end of a mediation process, but our point is that it is often, and as much,
a factor of intermediary obstacles, or of an accumulation thereof. An unskillful mediator, who
would work only on the basis of his or her own intuitions, may pile up many little errors, which
may be minor, each one taken individually, but may at the end lead to a catastrophe. We want to
explore in this paper such possible missteps, as missed opportunities, from the “intuitive
mediator.”
If mediators are not aware of how misleading some intuitions can be, they run the risk of loosing
their efficiency in the process and of undermining the establishment of a better quality relation
between parties and the search for agreeable solutions.  We will explore some risky intuitions all
the way in a typical mediation session, where four common stages will be distinguished for the
clarity of the presentation (Lempereur, 1998b):Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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1.  The introduction to the mediation session
2.  Exposing facts and identifying interests
3.  Exploring options of solutions
4.  Concluding the mediation session
Following each stage, we have tried to establish a catalogue of behavioral reflexes from the
mediator which may lead to negative effects. These negative effects may be temporary (and
without real impact on the final outcome) or, on the contrary, they may last and contribute to the
general failure of the mediation. In the following list, as much as possible, these reflexes are
introduced in a more or less chronological order corresponding to a usual mediation process.
They will of course not happen in each session; and can emerge at random during exchanges at
diverse or other moments. After labeling the obstacle, we use five categories with the subsequent
meaning,
1.  Describing the frame of mind of the mediator and his or her behavioral intuition;
2.  Describing then the intuitive behavior;
3.  Associating some potential risks with that mediator’s behavior;
4.  Proposing some alternative behavioral strategy for the mediator;
5.  Enouncing some expected results of such alternative behaviors.
We have checked with mediators if they actually got these intuitions, and either developed some
behaviors in the same move, or on the contrary, were able to develop alternative behaviors,
despite their early intuitions.
As table 1 shows, categories 1 to 3 contribute to a “rather negative process”, whereas 5 includes
prescriptive advice, contributing to what we hope to be a rather “positive process”, with better
expected results. We could represent the structure the following way:Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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Table 1
We will now examine each of the four stages of the mediation process, and propose some usual
obstacles on the way. In the text, the “I” perspective will be used, it refers to the mediator’s inner
voice. It is as if we were in situation in his or her head and then followed his or her subsequent
actions.
STAGE 1:  INTRODUCTION STAGE OF A MEDIATION
1. 1. Prejudice about Mediation Knowledge
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. Parties know what the mediation is. I don’t
believe that  it’s necessary to explain what mediation is. I don’t want to lose any time.  It is
my wish, and I assume it is also the parties’ wish, that we should finish as soon as possible
this process and therefore be done with the process. I assume that parties have identified the
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-   Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I don’t explain what the mediation is to parties. I get
immediately to “business at hand”, to the core content of the conflict.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. I run the risk of incomprehension and
miscommunication with one or both of the parties who may confuse mediation with an
expertise, a litigation, a trial or arbitration. A party may expect the mediator, for example, to
come out with a decision, like a judge, at the end of the interactions.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I explain what mediation is – a mutually-
agreed-to process through which parties try to find a mutually acceptable agreement  –   and
what it is not – a place for pleading or exchange of arguments.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. Hopefully, I clarify the mediation
purpose in the parties’ minds and situate clearly the context and role of the mediator, while
insisting on the fact that mediation is a voluntary process where parties work together in a
search for solutions and where the final decision is made by the parties, be it a decision of
agreement or disagreement.
1. 2. Defense of Mediation
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. At a specific moment, and often at the
beginning, one of the parties may express doubts or skepticism about the relevance of
mediation in general and its usefulness in the situation at hand. Very often, a party who does
not know anything in mediation or is called in mediation by the other party or a third party
may be reluctant or skeptical about the need to be here. I feel obliged to do something to
correct this prejudice that such a party has towards mediation.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I defend the idea of mediation, its soundness. I explain that it
is very successful in many cases, and that myself I have a high rate of success.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. The more I try to defend the concept,
the more I may be perceived as trying to sell my merchandise or to get the job, the more I
may deepen the doubts in the party whom I’m trying to convince.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I explain that mediation is one of the modes
of conflict resolution, that if parties want, they may want to take the time to get some
information about its usefulness, that I may give them some, if they wish to, or may refer
them to people who have used it before, and can tell them the ups and downs of the parties. I
urge them to consult a lawyer also to check that from a legal point of view, it is all right to
get on with mediation, and that this lawyer can be consulted at any time during the process, if
they feel like it. Finally, I recall that parties have the right to choose another method of
dispute resolution at any time during the process, if they consider this would serve their
interests better. In one word or in a hundred, parties must feel free to be there. It is a
voluntary process, not a panacea. It is probably worth a trial, if they want to.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy.  I obtain as much as possible a
voluntary commitment on behalf of the parties that they will try mediation out in order to
look for a way to solve their problem.
1. 3. Unilateral and Unquestioned Vision of the Mediator’s Role
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. It is not useful that the parties know how I
see things and how  I want to proceed as a mediator.  This only concerns me. Why should
they know about the hardware? Anyway, they would not understand much about it. Also, as
everyone proceeds differently, it doesn’t make any sense to talk about one’s conception.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I don’t  explain how I see my role as a mediator. Whether I
favor the empowerment method that makes my role more facilitative of process, or the
advisory method that makes my role more content-oriented, I do not tell the parties.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. The parties may be surprised by the
way I want to proceed.  They are most likely waiting to hear solutions from me or, on the
contrary, will be surprised at the moment when I try to present them, because they may have
been told that contrary to expectations, in general, mediators do not propose solutions.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I say precisely how I see my task as a
mediator either with each party alone beforehand, or with both parties, in a joint session.  I
tell them if I intend to have caucuses (individual meetings with each party) or not. I tell themObstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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that I intend to give them my opinion on how to solve their problems, or that I will rather
abstain, or that I may start with the latter, and move to the former at a moment of deadlock, if
they want me to do so. I check with the parties that they are comfortable with the methods. I
make them feel that the most important is for them to consider that I am there to serve them,
and that they should tell me at any time, if they are uncomfortable with what I do.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I permits both parties to be informed
of the variety of available methods and allows myself to adjust, when necessary.
1.4. Self-Defense as a Mediator
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. At some point, one of the parties expresses
doubts  about the validity of the way I choose to proceed.  These doubts are not so much
about mediation as such, but about myself as a mediator. A party may put into question my
skills, my experience or my neutrality as a mediator. I feel that I am unjustly treated and I
intend to correct this unfair view of myself, intentions and actions. I feel attacked as a
mediator
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I defend myself. For example, I explain that contrary to what a
party said, I am not taking side. It is just his or her perception, that should be amended,
thanks to my arguments.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. There is a risk to deepen the doubt in
the party whom I want to convince and who may interpret my intervention as self-serving. I
may give the impression that beyond the parties’ interests, what really matters to me is to get
or keep my job as a mediator.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I express a deep understanding of what I hear,
when I feel attacked. I say that I respect this perception. I show I am really sorry for it, as the
last thing I want is to add myself as one more problem to the already existing problems of the
parties between themselves. I remind the parties that my mandate as a mediator is at the will
of the parties, and that I would complete my task when it is the wish of the parties that I do
so.  The process may be stopped at any time by the parties, if they consider that I am not fit. IObstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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recall that if the parties can do it, and wish to, they should not hesitate to replace the mediator
at any time.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. By clearly showing my duty to my
principals – i.e. the parties –, I will most likely confirm my legitimacy as mediator. I
demonstrate a mediator’s in regard to the situation and in regard to him/herself.
1.5.  Hasty Behavior as a Mediator
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. As I hope a swift and successful intervention
of mediation, I want to avoid any loss of time. I don’t believe that it is necessary to introduce
the process and planning of the mediation.  I want to start right away, even without process
introduction. I want to leave a maximum amount of spontaneity and suppleness to the parties.
It is a way of differentiating mediation and litigation. There should not be any rules for
mediation. If any rule needs to emerge at some point, it will, and I will take care of it at that
point.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I get on with the matter immediately, and ask what happened.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. The parties may develop a false idea
about how the mediation process is structured.  I risk to surprise and disappoint them by my
methods. They may think it is a free flow of thoughts without any guidance, without any
internal script in the mediator’s head, an exercise of pure improvisation.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I present as clearly as possible to both parties
the different foreseeable steps of the mediation process and even check with them that they
are comfortable with this progression.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I reassure the parties who discover
that mediation can be structured, that voluntariness and suppleness of process do not mean
anarchy. Effective communication on the way to follow guides the parties through the
process before it even starts.  This early communication provides a reference point that may
be used later on if necessary.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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1.6. Overconfidence in Unstructured Spontaneity of Communication
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. I want to finish this process rules as soon as
possible.  It is obvious that the parties should not interrupt each other, so obvious it does not
make any sense to recall it.  If necessary, I will remind them of such truism as we go along, if
they start interrupting each other.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I don’t establish any rules of communication between the
parties. Whoever wants to start talking is welcome to do so.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. At the moment when one of the
parties interrupts the other, my intervention will give the impression that I favor one side
over the other. Even if this interruption is not per se a breach of neutrality, and does not
concern content, it will be perceived as such. I may even have to deal with a party that is
arguing with me on why some stuff should not be said, deserve interruption, that he or she is
surprised that I even let the other say such statements, without interrupting him or her myself.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I announce in my introduction the reasons
why the rule of non-interruption is important. I tell the parties it is the best guarantee that
parties will get heard, and that each will have its turn. I ask if parties agree to that rule and I
get the parties to adhere to it in an explicit way. I insist that as a mediator, if they agree to
this, I may sometimes interrupt a party to restate what I hear and to make sure I understand.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. By educating the parties early on the
basic rules of effective communication, I facilitate the communication process, I tell them
indirectly that the best is to make sure each (including the other…) has a chance to speak. I
also urge this way parties to get some detachment towards their views, when the other
speaks, knowing they will find some time and space to speak themselves.
1.7. Resort to Highly Subjective Principles
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. Everyone knows what respect is.  It makes
perfectly sense to ask parties to have respect for each other during the mediation session. It isObstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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a concept that is sufficiently general that allows me to establish order when necessary by
recalling it.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I ask the parties to commit to respecting each other in the
exchanges to come.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. In contrast to the rule of non-
interruption, the principle of mutual respect is much more difficult to enforce, it is very
subjective and any attempt to do so may be perceived as partial towards one party over the
other, because the definition of respect varies from one person to another and may be linked
to  particular circumstances. I may project my own values of what respect means, and may
look partial in my intervention. Moreover, if parties are very angry at or with each other,
asking from them to be respectful of the other may be beyond their capacity. If I ask them for
more respect, they may just say that they were respectful. My whole approach may backfire.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I prefer to stick only to the rule of non-
interruption and say it is the best way for me, as a mediator, to objectify a basic form of
mutual respect. I will not have to judge if respect is respected or not, by projecting my
values. I may tell the parties that by enforcing the rule of non-interruption, I will, without any
doubt, walk side-by-side with the underlying principle of mutual respect.  I ask both parties
to agree to the rule of non-interruption and tell parties that I may come back to their
commitment on that issue, if at any time it is forgotten.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I assure that one party will not be
singled out for that matter of respect during the process, in any other way that through the
objective observation or violation of the rule of non-interruption.
1.8. Overconfidence in an Unstructured Transparency
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. The principle of confidentiality is so evident.
Bringing it up will just prolong the process introduction. It is really time to get to business.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I do not suggest the principle of confidentiality.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. There is a risk that one or both parties
will feel ill at ease with disclosing information. They may fear that what they may say may
be held against them later or told publicly, in court for example or even with the constituency
of the other party, at the expense of their own reputation as agents of their principals.
Therefore, by not dealing with information disclosure, outside the mediation session, I urge
parties to say the least they can, and information retention may become the rule for both
sides. This situation is at the expense of a real effort to share information in order to
hopefully find a zone of possible agreement.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I explain how useful it is to develop common
principles in order to deal with what is said and what is done during the mediation session. I
ask parties if they can mutually agree to the principle of confidentiality or, at least, I ask if
we could agree to what kind of information, if any, can or cannot be publicized at the end of
each session. I explain  that the mediator must also respect this rule as part of his/her role. I
explain that, as parties may want to account for the mediation with their respective
principals, one way of doing so, without endangering the mediation process, may well be to
spend some time, at the end of each mediation session, on writing together what we want to
say publicly and/or to a smaller audience, and what we may want to keep confidential.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I reassure the parties that they have
nothing to fear from mediation, that it will not prevent them later to pursue other avenues,
and that it will not appear as a sequence of gestures of weakness in the eyes of their
respective principals. While keeping discretion, I allow the most  transparency possible 1)
between the parties on one side, who could basically say everything they want, and  2)
between each negotiator and his or her possible principals. Confidence is built on the basis
that the information shared will only be used in the mediation at hand, unless otherwise
agreed upon by the parties.
1.9. No Mediation Contract
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. I don’t want to use too much legal jargon, or
forms, nor put too much pressure on the parties at the outset. Defining or, even worse,
writing a contract has too much legal connotation. I want to avoid this, as much as I want.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
Alain Pekar Lempereur, ESSEC IRÉNÉ & Research Center, 2003  13
Also, writing a contract may induce my personal responsibility as an agent of both parties,
and I do not want this to happen.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I do not formalize the mediation process in any way. I do not
even check that each party commits to implementing the decisions made during the
mediation.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. Everyone, the parties and myself, run
the risk to lose time.  If there is not any even soft type of contract on how to proceed in
mediation between the parties, and between them and the mediator, the mediator may be
faced with one or both parties threatening at any time to leave the table. It is obvious that it
may not be meaningful to initiate a mediation process if both parties are not willing to try,
maybe during a preset time, to take mediation seriously and to follow through with the
outcomes.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator.  I ask each party to commit from the
beginning, before the mediation officially starts, that they really agree to all these guidelines
we mentioned earlier (non-interruption, confidentiality), that they will try this mediation in
good faith and that they will follow through with any mutually agreed upon outcome of the
mediation. When I have both sides agreement, it is now time to start the process itself.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. We have our “mediation contract”. It
does not say we will have a settlement at the end of the mediation process. It just says that all
the parties and the mediator have put all the chances on their side to increase the likelihood
of success. With such a preliminary contract (of second order), I reassures each party of the
serious nature of the mediation process and the fact that some positive results are possible.
1.10.  Problem Claiming by the Mediator
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. The problem is complex and I have the
impression that if I don’t take the initiative making this problem mine, things will not get
better, parties will never be able to solve it.  Thanks to my skills and techniques, I will be
able to get to a solution rapidly. I am now showing the parties that their conflict is my
problem.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
Alain Pekar Lempereur, ESSEC IRÉNÉ & Research Center, 2003  14
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I appropriate the problem in terms of content from the
beginning. I tell them this is now my problem, as much as theirs.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. The more it becomes my problem, the
more I run the risk that it is less and less each party’s problem. Parties may be alienated from
the problem.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. The way I proceed with the mediation is
based on the fact that each party needs to take responsibility for their part of the problem.  I
let them own the content while I manage the process.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. Makes the parties responsible for the
problem and its resolution.  Divides the work and allows the mediator to focus on managing
the process.
1.11. Judiciarization of the Process
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. A mediation process may look like judicial
proceedings. The more the mediation process integrates good habits of the judiciary system –
getting evidence to have the facts validated, to know each person’s rights, to enhance my
authority as that of a judge, etc. – , the better it looks to me, and anyway, why would I try to
reinvent the wheel when centuries of law have produced such a well structured system. I do
not want to invent the process; I can just stick as much as possible to the legal proceedings,
placate their methods on mediation.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I model my behavior on the behavior of a judge. I also show to
each party how much authority I have. I do not want feelings out, but straight facts. I ask for
evidence, and will not budge until I have it, until I can determine who is right or wrong on
each issue.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. If anarchy is not the answer, similarly
legal formalism reduces much of the flexibility and of the creativity that make mediation anObstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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asset. If I just transpose rules of judicial proceedings, I may increase the rigidity of
mediation, and it may just not be appropriate.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator.  I help structure process, and consider
mediation as its own way of solving conflicts, away from courts and much of its formalism.
If the parties or I consider it helpful, I may borrow, or adapt some elements from the
judiciary system, while being careful not to add problems to the existing conflict.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy.  I try to strike a subtle balance
between flexibility and structure for the mediation process.
STAGE  2:  EXPOSING FACTS & IDENTIFYING INTERESTS
2.1.  Unvoluntary Partiality
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. Now that the substance of the conflict will be
dealt with, someone should start exposing facts. I see that one of the parties really want to
start speaking. Why not after all? Or I consider that the  person who came to see me first,
who has grievances to expose, the plaintiff so to speak, really needs to express himself or
herself first in the mediation, and thus I am prone to let that happen.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I choose who should start or let one of the parties start.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. If I choose who starts, I may make
both parties uncomfortable: the party who speaks “first” may ask herself why she should start
first, why not the other, whereas the party who is not speaking first wonders why he could
not speak first. In most mediations, the word “plaintiff” should probably be banished. The
process will often show two visions of the world where each has complaints against the
other. If I let one party start, without intervening, I implicitly consecrate the assumption that
one party has more to reproach to the other. By giving a person the opportunity to go first, I
let him or her take the lead on process. This party is somehow rewarded for a preemptive
strike on the mediation, and may be encouraged to do it again later in the next steps. The
other party may feel unjustly treated for me to let that happen. Such a simple gesture of whoObstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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speaks first on content, which seems so insignificant, may hinder the mediator’s neutrality in
the parties’ perception. It is a missed opportunity for me to show from the beginning the
personal commitment to neutrality and impartiality.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I ask both parties if one would like to start. If
one says yes, I check with the other if it is OK. If both respond positively, the one who
speaks first may be picked at random (for example, pulling a name out of a  hat, tossing a
coin).
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. Hopefully, parties will view me as
very attentive to questions of balancing, as striving to build or confirm my mediator’s
neutrality.  I show that the mediator is always in the middle, at an equal distance from both
parties.
2.2. Unilateral Attention
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. I want to let each person expose their facts
without interrupting them.  I want to show that I am listening, however long it is. I should
probably not interrupt, however painful and long it appears to the other side. The other side’s
turn will come, and should just bear with us.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I let one party bring to light the facts (or their version of them)
during a long moment without taking care of the other party.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. Neglecting the other party, in favor of
the most vociferous one, means alienating, frustrating, or provoking this other party, even if a
long time is necessary for one of both parties.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I warn each party that I may interrupt one of
them at any moment. If necessary, I establish a time limit.  I warn the party who will be
listening first that it may be difficult to listen to the other’s version of the facts and I keep an
eye contact with them throughout the other’s exposé, reassuring that their turn will come
soon.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I continue to balance the amount of
time each party talks and I minimize any frustration from those who are interrupted while
speaking and from those who are listening to that speech. I also show to each party the
importance of eye contact.
2.3. Intellectual Preemption
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. In this conflict, I want to know as much as
possible, and I also want to show how well I understand the problem and master a file. I have
a certain number of hypotheses that I want to confirm. There are plenty of opportunities for
me to precede the parties’ thinking. I may use questioning to probe them. Or I may also
propose solutions that they would not have thought about. I use my brains to solve issues
before anyone else had even tried to.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I ask several questions on the facts in order to understand
clearly each person’s version. I propose some solutions.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. My behavior of curiosity, a little
pushy; may be badly interpreted. I am not simply listening, I am always further than the
parties. Each party may have the feeling to be grilled over their version of the facts and feel
obliged to justify themselves constantly.  They may have the feeling that I am orienting the
debate in a direction that is not conceived by them, and looks even unfavorable to them.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. Rather than preceding a party, I follow them
step by step and use active listening to demonstrate my good understanding of their points. I
use “I” messages and ask questions for clarification if necessary. I am not using leading or
loaded questions, i.e. rhetorical questions.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I permit each party to hear what the
other has said through the words of the mediator, without me putting words in the parties’
mouth.  I also make each party more and more familiar with a more efficient way to
communicate, by using questioning et not rhetoric.
2.4. Obsession with TruthObstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. In my discussions with parties, I am
motivated by my legal background or by my previous work experience in discovery.  I hope
to be able to discriminate true and false facts or statements in order to be able to discriminate
who is right or wrong and to find the adequate solution, on the basis of proved facts.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I ask for evidence whenever a person presents a fact. I show
how scrupulous I am about knowing the truth.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. Again, I run the risk of nurturing the
confusion between mediation and a trial. I may induce some positive/negative feelings in the
parties.  I may be stuck with a never-ending debate on the validation of a proof.  I may waste
my time and that of the mediators in this one more example of displaced legalism.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I let parties present the facts with as much
precision as they want or can.  I abstain from using legal jargon. I tell parties that they have
an interest in focussing on possible solutions for the future, rather than on facts of the past,
and even less on which facts are admissible or not.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I keep a process oriented toward its
resolution and as objective as possible  vis-à-vis each person and each fact.  I allow the
parties to be implicated in the process without being lost in legal jargon.
2.5. Confusion between Listening and Agreeing
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. Listening to one of the parties, I want to
show to that party that I listen well and understand what he or she says. I should not hesitate
to show signs of interest in what is said.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I knot, I make a lot of gestures of approval. I make it known
when I agree with one or the other parties.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. The other party could take my
intervention as a way of validating the other’s argument or worse, as a proof of siding withObstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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one party against the other.  There is a leap from legitimate empathy (the capacity to put
oneself in the other’s person shoes and to show understanding) to sympathy (the proximity to
another person in thoughts and feelings) or worse to agreement.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I should use formulas such as “I see” or “I
understand”, and avoid “OK” or “I agree.”  As a mediator, I use active listening which
restates what was said to the best of my ability and ask the party to tell me if I got it right. I
do everything I can so that this paraphrase is not mistaken for an agreement. In an explicit
way, I may even have to tell parties that it is not because one shows empathy that ones means
agreement.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I try to embody a respectful mode of
communication. Not only I demonstrate to the speaking party that I am listening to him or
her, and it is also possible for me to accustom the other party to hear what was said by the
former through the mouth of the mediator.  I also show that there is a way of expressing
tough issues, while remaining calm and while using “hearable” words. I clearly distinguish
expressions of assertiveness from those of aggressiveness.
2.6. Obsession with Cross-Examination
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. I see that one party who has been waiting for
quite some time does not agree with what is said, is no longer able to listen to the other’s
version of the facts without presenting his or hers. I feel I somehow need to have this party
take over the conversation, and find a voice.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I encourage the silent party to intervene in order to react to
what is said, and correct the first version of the facts.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. I run the risk of comforting a
confrontational logic, where each party always feels like correcting the other’s version. I
increase the verbal escalation. I could get to a point where parties ask the mediator, where
he/she stands vis-à-vis each version and determine who is right or wrong.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I favor a complementary logic and a proactive
approach which consists of asking the silent party to say how he/she sees the situation from
his/her point of view, without necessarily referring to exactly what the other party was
saying, without reacting. I explain that even if two parties may disagree on what happened,
mediation is not about agreeing on past events, on allocating blame, but hopefully on future
resolution that both parties could live with.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I permit two versions of the facts to
coexist without favoring one or the other, and without polarizing them. I value the plurality
of opinions, without trying to come out with one opinion or the opinion.
2.7. Ping-Pong Impression
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. The parties are prisoners of their own past
and have much difficulty to distance themselves from it. I feel like a witness of interactions
that I do not master. I have the impression of simply counting points between parties. I would
like to interrupt the parties, but do not know how to do it. I have a “sinking” feeling.
-   Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I just witness the exchanges.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. By doing nothing, I empty most of the
interest of mediation. Unable to imagine a way out, I forget my duty to process. I even run
the risk of blocking the mediation or of not preventing an escalation.  Without reacting in due
time, the mediator risks to loss all control over the process and to lose all hope for a
resolution.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I somehow limit the face-to-face situation and
stop in a respectful or firm manner the verbal logic that turns in a circle for the parties. I
identify the logic, name it, and ask for a pause or a caucus, if necessary. I encourage the
parties in their desire for a resolution and ask them to think of the future, and to try to take
some distance towards the past, while telling them you understand your request is far from
being easy for them. If you were in their situation, it would not be easy for you either.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I leave behind a vicious circle of
escalation in order to create a virtuous circle of appeasement.  I orient the process towards
resolution. I do everything to move things forward.
2.8. Confusion between Agreement on Facts and on the Resolution of Conflict
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. I abandon the principle that the two versions
are both relatively true from each party’s point of view, and feel that it is important to
discover the truth that will serve as a basis for resolution. How can we get the future straight
if we do not have the past straight?
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I try to make both parties agree on the facts.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. Again the mediation process may be
blocked.  I may miss the target which is not an agreement on the facts. Parties may be stuck
forever in the past without ever being able to go forward.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I try to install a logic of the future which
indicates that a mediation can engender a resolution even if the parties do not agree on the
facts. I explain that many parties, who disagreed on who was to be blamed, who was right or
wrong, have often found a satisfactory solution together.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I put into place a reflex of a future-
oriented process. Each party can live with the past, as they see it, and accept that they were
not able to convince the other side to adhere to it, or to have a third-party siding with them on
the issue. They contemplate the possibility of new horizons, away from possible errors,
however big or small from all sides.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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STAGE 3:  LOOKING FOR OPTIONS OF SOLUTIONS FOR AN AGREEMENT
3.1.  Assimilation of Positions to Solutions
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. After having listened to the facts, I have the
impression that I know now how to resolve this problem and that the problem is mature
enough to be resolved. There is a feeling of urgency to move towards solutions.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I move now toward solutions in order to get to an agreement.
In order to achieve this, I ask each party to indicate their position, what they want.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. Because of antagonistic positions from
the parties (Fisher & Alii, 1991), there is a risk of blocking the process, of preventing parties
from looking for solutions.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. After the facts and feelings are out, I make
explicit that I will try, with the parties’ help, to discover their interests and related needs,
those very motivations that they would like to satisfy in reaching a resolution to the current
conflict.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy.  Going beyond the positions, and
understanding their underlying interests, it is possible to increase the likelihood to build
solutions that the parties have never imagined before these discussions.
3.2. Linking Common Interests and the Resolution of the Conflict
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. Only common interests are the ones
necessary to get to solutions and to build an agreement.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I only stress common interests with the parties. I indicate that
if they have common interests, they are likely to find an agreement.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. Having common interests is no
guarantee for success. If two people both want the same thing, like a territory for example,Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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they have an interest in common, that does not always make it easy for them to negotiate a
deal. What as a mediator I should be looking for, are common interests that are compatible,
like wanting a territory for two different reasons. Also different interests can be quite useful.
In only focussing on common interests, I run the risk of overlooking the creating value
opportunities that are based on trade-offs. Sometimes, parties who have different interests
may precisely work towards an agreement which finds ways of responding to each person’s
differences and priorities. A major interest of one party can be fulfilled by the other, if a
major interest of the latter can be also fulfilled in return.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I explore common and different interests and
underline that it is in searching a satisfactory and optimal way to deal with these two types of
interests that the best agreements are found.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I permit each party to live not only
with what brings them together but with what pushes them apart. It works towards an optimal
utilization of all ways of finding a resolution.
3.3.  The Mediator as the only Master on Board
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. I have the feeling that if one part of the
process escapes me, the parties will fall back into their fixed and irreconcilable differences. I
want to remain in charge.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I show that I am the leader and, for example, I ask each party
to keep speaking to me rather than to the other party.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. There is a risk of paternalism and of
vanity in the mediator’s mission. Each party risks to lose ownership of the problem, precisely
at a moment when the mediator succeeds, i.e. when parties start communicating efficiently
without any help.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I attempt to progressively move away from a
communication model based on three, toward one based on two parties negotiating together.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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I pass from a managed process to a decentralized one. I accept to lose control, when I see
parties could take over without risk for the search for solution.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I hope to encourage the adoption of
an open attitude from the parties towards each other, as well as a progressive withdrawal of
my role. The paradox is that the most successful mediator is the one who is doing nothing
any more, while the parties have now embraced a problem-solving approach with each other.
3.4.  Temptation to Propose a Solution to the Parties
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. Parties have unveiled their interests, and
some options of solution may be now on the table, but none seems to work. I have my small
opinion. I feel I know what is best for the parties.  It would be a pity to pass by the
reconciliation that I envisage. I am afraid of the incapacity of each party to discover such
solution and to reach an agreement on their own.  I can show that I have not been appointed
as a mediator for nothing, that I am useful. I hope to show myself as a leader.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I indicate to the parties how they will be able to get out of this
situation and which solution is possible.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. How do I know I will not propose
inappropriate solutions for one or both parties?  And what if one party adheres to the
mediator’s solution, and not the other? What about impartiality or neutrality?
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator.  I urge the parties to find a solution
themselves. I use questions instead of answers.  I explain the brain-storming rules, so that the
parties may be able to find solutions together. If for whatever reason at some point I feel
compelled to propose solutions, before I do anything, I check with the parties if they want me
to move from process facilitator to expert on content, and rather than proposing one solution,
I propose several of them, showing they are only options thrown on the table, among others,
to help parties find the solution they find the best for them.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy.  I continue to make each party
responsible for the search for solutions and for the final agreement.  I have not substituted myObstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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own judgement to theirs. Hopefully, I have reinforced the mediator’s neutral role, in contrast
to a presumptuous one. I optimize the likelihood that the solution will be carried out and will
respond to the needs of each party in the long term, as they are the ones who have finally
elaborated it, and not me.
3.5. Taking Side
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. One of the parties has the feeling that
because of my experience I am well placed to find the best solution, and urge me to give my
opinion. I believe this party is not simply trying to use me in order to push a solution which
is more advantageous for him/her. It is true, I have some intuition on how to resolve this
problem. I understand this request to say what I think, to tell what to do.
-   Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I let myself be tempted by one of the parties who asks me to
propose a solution. I propose a solution.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. Again, the risk is high to propose
inappropriate solutions for one or both parties.  I may displease the party who asked me,
and/or the other who did not ask me at all. My neutrality can be at stake in any party’s eyes.
Moreover, now that I have taken side, somehow, the same party or the other may want me to
come out with solutions for other issues,  either because they think I may again favor the
same side, or because I may now have to come out for the other side, as a way of
counterbalancing my first opinion. When can this slippery slope ever stop?
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I ask the party the reasons why they want me
to find a solution and express my strong belief that they are capable of finding their own
solutions to the problem. I address the request to the other side by saying that the most
competent to propose solutions is not me, but the other party (deflection). Or I can send back
the request to the person who made it, saying that he or she must have some idea in mind on
the issue (reflection).. Or I send it back to both parties (“omniflection”).  Or I send it back to
a virtual party or judge, asking both parties or one what solution they think this absent party
would propose (“extraflection”).  In the worst case, again, I propose several solutions, never
just one.  And, I present them as options among others.  I insist on the necessity for all
options to be validated by each party.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. See 4.2.
3.6. The Mediator, Deus ex Machina of Justice
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. There are several elements that make one
party seem more right than the other, or that make the likely agreement, as it is, unfair. I do
not want to lose the opportunity to turn things in the direction of the one who is unjustly
mistreated. I have a role to play in this delegated administration of justice. I cannot let go a
solution that would be unfair. It would be unacceptable from a fairness point of view. I feel
compelled to restore the balance of justice.
-   Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I tell one of the parties that she is right or wrong, or that the
would-be agreement is unfair;
-   Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. I may not look neutral anymore,
whatever I say. I plead for one of the parties, and any of my interventions may now be
tainted with that decision I just made. All my credibility may be lost with one of the parties
who will see me as a negotiator for the other side.  I run the risk to lose the capacity to
mediate in the future because of the incapacity to remain neutral, or the suspicion on any of
my moves now, even those moves that may just be process-oriented.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. I do not hesitate to ask both parties how they
feel about that question, clause, agreement, what kind of legitimacy is pervading it, and if
they consider that the envisaged solution satisfies their interests and needs.  Also, I ask them
to compare the solutions with those that they may be able to get outside mediation (i.e. a
legal decision).  I can also ask them to seek legal advice before signing anything. In the worst
case, I will use the “I message” in order to let it be known how I see things in telling each
party that they may require me to leave, after I tell them my opinion, because I may have lost
all credibility in terms of impartiality.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. I do not project my values of what is
just on the parties, I consider them as adults who can make their decision as they see fit. I can
however take into account the problem, making sure that there is informed consent, and thatObstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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they sought all necessary professional advice. I have let all parties position themselves in
relation to their personal feelings and decide for themselves what is the best way to proceed.
The only limit to this “laisser faire” is of course when I am aware that the law could be
violated in a settlement to become. I may want to ask lawyers to check the validity of the
agreement, and in the worst case, withdraw.
STAGE 4:  CONCLUDING THE MEDIATION SESSION
4.1. Never Accepting Defeat
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. The parties turn in circles and it seems that
we will never get an agreement despite all the efforts used thus far. I am disappointed and do
not want to admit it.  I take this as a personal defeat and want to avoid this at all costs. I want
to bring my cornerstone to help with the construction.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I try to extract a last-minute agreement.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. We may get to an agreement against
the will of one or the other parties, with the risk that such an agreement will neither put into
place nor long-lasting. Parties need to live with the agreement. In this case, it is not the
parties’ agreement, but the mediator’s one.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. In the worst case, I ask each party to verify
that they have sufficiently evaluated all alternative solutions and that they have not
underestimated them in terms of time, costs, etc.  I could draw up a document where I state
that at least the mediation has identified key points of agreement/disagreement.  I accept that
the mediation obligation is mainly of means and not ends, and I congratulate the parties on
having attempted to find a solution.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. It is always possible to attempt to
conclude on a positive note, even in the absence of an agreement. I show that mediation does
not imply an agreement and that an agreement is made only when both parties feel that it
serves their interests best than another means of conflict resolution, such as litigation forObstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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example. If they do not think it does, because they have made a careful evaluation, then of
course, it remains their decision.
4.2. Expression of Discouragement
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. Things are not going well. This session led to
no agreement, and I doubt the next ones will be more successful. In my mind, parties will
never get any agreement, I feel discouraged and want to be honest with the parties about it,
and tell them.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I tell parties that the mediation (session) fails, and that I feel
discouraged.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. Contrary to the mediator’s view,
parties may have a positive perception of the process, may benefit from the intercourse in
ways I am unaware of. If I speak about my disappointment, I may induce in the parties a
feeling of failure, that may get failure more certainly than it would otherwise.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. A mediation session is one among several.
Sometimes, there are ups and downs. I must accept that situation. Some positive thinking
may be welcome. I will always remember this priest in an A.M.E. church who was saying
“When you feel discouraged, encourage yourself”, and as a mediator, I may add “and
encourage the parties”. The more parties are congratulated for what they have already
accomplished, like talking to each other, identifying what they may agree to, or what they do
not (yet) agree to, the more they may get further on their road to success. Patience is
necessary on that road.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy.  Wishful thinking does not make
mediation succeed per se. At the same time, a speech focussing on the future, on the next
meeting that may help them sort out some of their contentious points provides a positive
frame that is welcome. They leave the room on a lighter note, that help think about new ways
of getting unstuck.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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4.3. Premature Closure
-  My frame of mind and intuitions as a mediator. Here on the contrary, I have the impression
parties are close to an agreement, but I am afraid that they may change their minds. I want to
end on a positive note at all costs and before parties come back on their decisions, I want to
put it in writing.
-  Mediator’s intuitive behavior. I conclude the mediation when both parties find a common
ground.
-  Potential risks associated with this intuitive behavior. There may be some premature closure,
in this quick decision. However parties may not have explored all creating-value
opportunities, and checked that this agreement was well within their mandate and satisfied
their interests better than their best non-negotiated alternative.
-  Alternative strategy of behavior as a mediator. Rather than getting a quick and maybe bad
agreement, I assure myself that the agreement addresses all the issues that have been dealt
with during the mediation, short-term and long-term issues, that parties have well understood
what is expected from each, and that they now have a way of working with each other that
will not lead to a conflict in a near future. I make sure that no value has been left on the table.
When I have done all the above, I summarize the clauses of the agreement, with the help of
the parties, and check that the draft captures well what parties wish to commit to. Before any
signing, I also ask each party to check that this agreement is in accordance with their
mandate.
-  Expected results of the alternative behavioral strategy. All the last minute checks aim at
maximizing the chances for a good agreement and for a quality implementation. Until the
end, parties have been empowered with the search for the best solution, may claim it as
yours, and therefore will more likely execute it in good faith.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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AND EVEN MORE…
Mediators know that they are numerous obstacles in their task, new ones everyday. Many
obstacles are not captured in our catalogue. Hopefully, our list will help mediators think harder
about this intuitive versus alternative types of behaviors. They may still increase their sense of
distance, their reflex to question the “of-course” behavior, in ensuring that such behavior serves
the parties’ objectives, and is more likely than any alternative one to increase the chance of
mediation success. Knowing how imperfect my first steps were on these rocky roads, and how
far they are from a steady boulevard, I ask my readers for forgiveness. I also urge mediators to
go on with their intuition on when to trust or mistrust intuition.Obstacles to a Successful Mediation Process
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